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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Fedorenko v. United States: The Memories
and Emotions of World War II Endure
The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the revocation
of a World War II refugee's naturalized citizenship,1 refusing to apply the
Chaunt v. United States2 test of materiality to a misrepresentation found
in the refugee's visa application. Significantly, the Court also held that
courts do not have broad equitable powers in a denaturalization proceed-
ing when the naturalized citizenship was procured illegally or by willful
misrepresentation of material facts. Fedorenko v. United States deals
specifically with an accused concentration camp guard, but its ramifica-
tions are unclear for other persons who were forced to assist in the camps
and who entered this country after the war.
Feodor Fedorenko was born in the Ukraine and served in the Russian
army until 1941, when he was captured by German troops. The Germans
trained him to serve as an armed concentration camp guard and sent him
to Treblinka, a notorious extermination camp in Poland.3 In 1949, he ap-
plied for admission to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act
(DPA) of 1948," misrepresenting on his visa application his whereabouts
during the war years, and failing to note his service as a concentration
camp guard. After arriving in the United States in 1949, he led an un-
eventful and law-abiding life. When Fedorenko applied for naturalization
in 1969, he failed again to reveal that he had served as a guard at Treb-
linka. He was naturalized in 1970.
In 1977, the United States filed a denaturalization action under 8
U.S.C. section 1451(a) against Fedorenko, charging him with willful con-
cealment of his wartime activities both in applying for a DPA visa and in
applying for citizenship. The government argued that Fedorenko had pro-
cured his naturalization illegally or by willful misrepresentation of mate-
rial facts under the terms of the denaturalization statute."
1. Pedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981).
2. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
3. Treblinka was literally a death camp:
It contained only living facilities for the SS and the persons working there. The
thousands who arrived daily on the trains had no need for barracks or mess
halls: they would be dead by nightfall. It was operated with barbarous method-
ology-brutally efficient-and such camps surely fill one of the darkest chap-
ters in the annals of human existence, certainly the darkest in that which we
call Western civilization .... The death toll? One million victims, according
to one witness.
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 901 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
4. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1952) provides:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . .. to institute pro-
ceedings ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting
a naturalized citizen to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturaliza-
tion on the gound that such order and certificate of naturalization were ille-
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In the midst of a highly emotional trial setting,* the district court
found that Fedorenko's guard duty was not voluntary7 and that even
though he had made certain misrepresentations, the government had
failed, under the Chaunt standard, to show by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if
known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their dis-
closure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship."8 The court
noted the apparent ambiguity in the second of these tests,9 and inter-
preted it to require the government to prove that an investigation
prompted by a complete and truthful response by Fedorenko would have
revealed facts justifying denial of citizenship. 0 Since the government had
failed to meet this burden, the district court refused to strip Fedorenko of
his citizenship."
As an alternative basis for its decision, the district court held that
since a denaturalization proceeding is a suit in equity,"3 the court has
broad equitable powers to weigh "the rights of the parties in light of all
the circumstances in order to arrive at a decision which is just and fair."18
The court reasoned that since naturalization courts have considered the
equities in determining whether citizenship should be granted,' 4 similar
discretion should also be available in denaturalization proceedings. Since
Fedorenko had been a responsible citizen and resident for twenty-nine
years and since the record before the court as to his alleged concentration
camp activities was inconclusive, the court found that the equities should
be weighed in favor of Fedorenko. 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,1' agreeing with the gov-
gaily procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation ....
6. As one example of the emotional intensity surrounding the trial, the district court
observed that the Jewish Defense League ran advertisements in newspapers offering
chartered buses from Miami Beach to Fort Lauderdale on opening day. A demonstration
outside the courtroom echoed with a chant: "Who do we want? Fedorenko. How do we want
him? Dead." 455 F. Supp. at 899. This emotional intensity also seems to have influenced the
government's presentation of their case. The government requested daily copy of the re-
porter's transcript and had four lawyers at its counsel table. In addition, the government
hired two Russian translators for Fedorenko's testimony. Id. at n.8. Futhermore, Attorney
General Civiletti personally argued the government's case before the Supreme Court.
7. Id. at 913.
8. 364 U.S. at 355.
9. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court also noted the ambiguity. 597 F.2d at
951; 101 S. Ct. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
10. 455 F. Supp. at 916.
11. Id. at 921.
12. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671 (1946).
13. 455 F. Supp. at 918.
14. In re Iwanenko's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. I1. 1958); In re Baspatow, 100 F.
Supp. 44 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Petition of R., 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944).
15. 455 F. Supp. at 920-21.
16. 597 F.2d at 954.
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ernment that the proper interpretation of the second Chaunt test was
that the government only had to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that disclosure of the true facts would have led the government to make
an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts warranting denial of
citizenship.' 7 In addition, the circuit court held that the lower court did
not have broad equitable powers under the denaturalization statute to
excuse a "fraudulent procurement of citizenship."" s
In affirming the revocation of Fedorenko's citizenship, the Supreme
Court agreed that the "right to acquire American citizenship is a precious
one, and that once it has been acquired, its loss can have severe and un-
settling consequences. '""9 However, the Court noted an important line of
cases 20 holding that a certificate of citizenship may be cancelled unless
there has been strict compliance with the conditions imposed by Congress
prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship: "Failure to comply with any
of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship 'illegally pro-
cured,' and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside."'"
Rather than being irreconcilable, these two lines of cases were used to
illustrate the importance to the Court of the issues at stake for both the
citizen and the government in a denaturalization proceeding.22
In the seven-to-two Fedorenko decision written by Justice Marshall,
the Court refused to accept the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the Chaunt test
for two reasons: first, the materiality standard announced in Chaunt was
as applied to false statements in applications for citizenship rather than a
visa; second, the arrests that Chaunt failed to disclose all took place after
he entered the United States." Fedorenko, on the other hand, had made
17. Id. at 951. This is also the interpretation offered by the dissenters in Chaunt, 364
U.S. at 357 (Clark, Whittaker, Stewart, JJ., dissenting). The circuits have split on the inter-
pretation of Chaunt. The district court's interpretation is in accord with the Third and
Ninth Circuits. United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3rd Cir. 1964); United States v. Rossi,
299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962); La Madrid-Peraza v. I.N.S., 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974). But
the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits support the Fifth Circuit's interpretation. Langham-
mer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1964); Kassab v. I.N.S., 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966).
18. 597 F.2d at 954.
19. 101 S. Ct. at 747. Justice Black wrote that "[n]ot only is United States citizenship a
'high privilege,' it is a priceless treasure." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting). See also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961); Baum-
gartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 675, 676 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
20. See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928); United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319
(1917); United States v. Ginberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
21. 101 S. Ct. at 747.
22. Id. at 748.
23. In Chaunt, the government sought to denaturalize the defendant because he had
procured his citizenship by concealment and misrepresentation of his arrest record. He had
stated on a form connected with his naturalization that he had never been arrested. In fact,
he had been arrested three times: once for distributing handbills in violation of an ordi-
nance, once for making a speech in violation of park regulations, and once for general breach
of peace. All of these arrests occurred at least ten years prior to the defendant's naturaliza-
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false statements in his application for a visa, and the alleged misconduct
occurred prior to his arrival-in the United States. Announcing a new stan-
dard for materiality of false statements in visa applications, the Court
stated that "at the very least, a misrepresentation must be considered
material if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant
ineligible for a visa." '
The Court then turned its attention to the DPA to see if Fedorenko
had indeed been ineligible for a visa. Under the DPA, the definition of
"displaced persons" eligible for immigration into this country specifically
excluded individuals who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil[ians]" or had "voluntarily assisted the forces . . . in their opera-
tions."2 5 Even though the district court had found that Fedorenko served
involuntarily as a guard at Treblinka,2" the Supreme Court was unable to
find any basis for an "involuntary assistance" exception in the language
of the DPA: "The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal
interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual's service as a
concentration camp armed guard-whether voluntary or involun-
tary-made him ineligible for a visa.
' '27
The laws under which Fedorenko was admitted to citizenship require
an applicant to have been admitted lawfully into the United States for
permanent residence.2 8 Lawful admission for permanent residence, in
turn, requires that the individual hold a valid unexpired immigrant visa.2e
Since the DPA provided that "all immigration laws.., shall be applica-
tion. Although the record in the case was not clear, it appeared that he was convicted of
only one charge, that involving the park regulation. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 748.
25. The Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1009, at § 2, incorporated the definition of
"refugees or displaced persons" contained in Annex I to the Constitution of the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization of the United Nations (IRO). The IRO Constitution, 62 Stat.
3037-55 (1946), was ratified by the United States on December 16, 1945 (T.I.A.S. No. 1846)
and became effective on August 20, 1948. 62 Stat. 3037. The IRO Constitution provided that
the following persons would not be eligible for refugee or displaced person status:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of coun-
tries, Member of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
Annex I, Part II, 62 Stat. 3051-52.
26. 455 F. Supp. at 913.
27. 101 S. Ct. at 750.
28. Sections 316(a) and 319(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952; 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1427(a), 1429.
29. At the time of Fedorenko's initial entry into the United States, § 13(a) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 161 (repealed in 1952), provided
that "[no immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he has an unexpired
immigration visa." The courts at that time consistently held that § 13(a) required a valid
visa and that a visa obtained through a material misrepresentation was not valid. See
United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951).
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ble to. . . eligible persons who apply to be or who are admitted into the
United States pursuant to this Act,"80 Fedorenko was not admissible into
the United States under the terms of the DPA. The Court concluded that
his citizenship must be revoked.8 1
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority's result,8 2 noting their
reluctance to adopt the Chaunt test and expressing his own preference
for doing so. Justice White, on the other hand, dissented 31 on the narrow
ground that while the court of appeals had correctly interpreted Chaunt,
it had incorrectly focused its attention solely on whether Fedorenko had
willfully concealed material facts when he applied for a visa. Since the
Fifth Circuit had failed to review the district court's application of
Chaunt to Fedorenko's concealment of material facts at the time he ap-
plied for citizenship, Justice White would have remanded the case for the
court of appeals to make this review. Finally, Justice Stevens, in an emo-
tional dissent," pointed out numerous problems with the case which the
majority, in his opinion, had failed to resolve. He seemed even more
troubled, however, with the underlying premise of the majority that
Fedorenko's or any citizen's involuntary conduct could provide the basis
for stripping him of his United States citizenship.
Several aspects of Fedorenko v. United States deserve note. First,
the Fedorenko majority was overly concerned with avoiding the Chaunt
test of materiality. Admittedly, Chaunt is factually distinguishable since
it involved a citizenship application which contained false statements
concerning events which had occurred after Chaunt's arrival in the
United States.3 5 Yet even these differences fail to explain the Court's re-
luctance to apply Chaunt, given the similarities and close relationship be-
tween a visa and citizenship.3" While differences do exist between the
two, the differences do not seem so great as to warrant application of one
test of materiality to misstatements in citizenship applications and an-
other to those in visa applications.
As another basis for its refusal to apply Chaunt, the Court distin-
guished Fedorenko's alleged misconduct itself as having occurred prior to
his arrival.8 7 Again the difference does not support two separate tests. A
person with a history of misconduct prior to his arrival would appear just
as unacceptable for United States residency or citizenship as a person
whose arrival preceded his misconduct. The use of two different tests
30. Displaced Persons Act, § 10.
31. 101 S. Ct. at 753.
32. Id. at 753-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Id., at 758-59 (White, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 759-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
36. A visa is an initial step in the process which eventually may lead to citizenship.
Also, a visa may be just as difficult to obtain as citizenship in light of the numerical limits
imposed on total lawful admittances. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1952). Furthermore, a visa, like citi-
zenship, can be revoked. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (1952).
37. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
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based on the date of a visa or citizenship applicant's misconduct, without
elaboration, is not the ideal way for the Court to draw its analysis.8
Another interesting aspect of the Court's decision was its refusal to
accept the circuit court's interpretation of the second part of the Chaunt
test-"that the Government need only prove that disclosure of the true
facts might have led to other facts which would have warranted denial of
citizenship."'s3 Yet although the Court refused to accept this interpreta-
tion, it declined expressly to reject the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in
favor of the district court's, that the Government must prove that a
truthful response by Fedorenko would have led to other facts which
would have justified denial of citizenship.' 0
Under the district court's interpretation of Chaunt, the Government
would bear a heavy burden (often impossible, according to Justice
White"1 ) .of proving facts that existed many years before the person ap-
plied for citizenship or visa. However Justice White's conclusion that the
district court's definition of materiality would greatly improve the odds of
successful concealment and encourage applicants to withhold information
is one-sided. 4' As a practical matter, the chances for abuse would be just
as great under the court of appeals' interpretation, since its application
suggests that a deliberately made false answer to any question the gov-
ernment might ask in a visa or citizenship application may be material.
Conceivably, a person's naturalization could be revoked years after it is
conferred, on the mere suspicion that certain undisclosed facts might
have warranted exclusion from the country. It should be noted, however,
that "by concluding that the government has demonstrated the actual ex-
istence of disqualifying facts-facts that themselves would have war-
ranted denial of [Fedorenko's] citizenship-the Court adheres to a more
rigorous standard of proof.' 3 This standard of proof is closer in line with
the district court's interpretation than with the court of appeals' and sug-
gests that, although Fedorenko lost his citizenship, future cases where the
Court chooses to apply Chaunt may be resolved under the higher stan-
dard of proof espoused by the district court.
The Court's rejection of the "involuntary assistance" exception in the
language of the DPA" is another interesting aspect of this case. The diffi-
culty with this position and the Court's literal construction of the Act is
that such an interpretation might bar many Jewish prisoners who sur-
38. The difficulty encountered by the Court in trying to avoid the Chaunt test is appar-
ent in the similarity between its new definition of materiality for the visa application-"if
the disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa," 101 S.
Ct. at 748-and the first part of the Chaunt test, which deems material those facts "which,
if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship." See text accompanying note 8 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
41. 101 S. Ct. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 756 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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vived the concentration camps from asserting that they had lawfully en-
tered this country after the war. For example, working prisoners who led
arriving prisoners to the gas chambers to be executed or wore armbands
as part of the ruse at the gas chambers or cut the hair of the females to
be executed would have technically assisted the enemy, albeit involunta-
rily and under the utmost duress, and would not have been eligible for
entry into the United States under the DPA. It is absurd to call their
conduct "assistance" inasmuch as it was involuntary, even though the
word "voluntarily" was omitted from the definition of an eligible person
in the DPA."5
The Court handled this dilemma in a footnote46 by concluding that
prisoners who did no more than lead new arrivals to the gas chambers or
cut the hair of women prisoners could not be considered to be assisting
the enemy in persecuting civilians. However, as Justice Stevens argued,
"the Court would give the word 'persecution' some not yet defined spe-
cially limited reading. In my opinion, the term 'persecution' clearly ap-
plies to such conduct; indeed, it probably encompasses almost every as-
pect of life or death in a concentration camp.' 47 The Supreme Court also
attempted to distinguish the Jewish workers and the Ukrainian guards on
such factors as the issuance of uniforms and weapons, the receipt of a
stipend, and the privilege of being allowed to leave the camp and visit the
nearby town.'8 These distinguishing factors, though, seem to bear no rela-
tion to the persecution of the Jews in the concentration camps.
The last noteworthy aspect of this case is the Court's facile approval
of the court of appeals' holding that district courts lack equitable discre-
tion to enter or refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization
against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or
by willful misrepresentation of material facts. The Court, in effect, re-
fused to look beyond the fact that Fedorenko made misstatements on his
visa and citizenship applications. That Fedorenko may have feared for his
life while he served at Treblinka or thought that repatriation to the So-
viet Union would follow if he told the truth on his DPA application are
possibilities" the Court chose to ignore. This rigid stance is disturbing
because if United States citizenship is a "priceless treasure,"' 1 then great
care should be exercised when it is granted or revoked. The Court's un-
45. The word "assistance" connotes voluntary assistance: "The act or action of assist-
ing; aid, help. . . ." WEBSTER'S THiRtD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 67 (1971).
46. 101 S. Ct. at 750 n.34.
47. Id. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 750 n.34.
49. Id. at 752-53.
50. The district court accepted Fedorenko's testimony that although Russian guards
did enjoy some privileges such as being able to walk down the road outside the camp, if a
guard did not return, he would be captured and executed. 455 F. Supp. at 901. The district
court also accepted one witness' testimony that thousands committed suicide rather than be
repatriated to the Soviet Union. Id. at 911.
51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 791.
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willingness to take even a brief look at the reasons behind Fedorenko's
misstatements seems unjustified.
Perhaps at the bottom of the Court's difficulties with this case were
the emotions and memories that remain of World War II concentration
camps. In his dissent, Justice Stevens recognized this force-"a sort of
'hydraulic pressure' that tends to distort our judgment."'
He concluded:
Perhaps my refusal to acquiesce in the conclusion reached by my
highly respected colleagues is attributable in part to an overreaction
to that pressure. Even after recognizing and discounting that factor,
however, I remain firmly convinced that the Court has committed the
profoundest sort of error by venturing into the unknown to find a ba-
sis for affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. That human
suffering will be a consequence of today's venture is certainly predict-
able; that any suffering will be allayed or avoided is at best doubtful. 6
Bernie M. Tuggle
The Impact of Title VII Protection on FCN
Treaties: Conflict and Interpretation
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,1 a recent Second Circuit
case, brings into focus a direct conflict between United States domestic
law and the provisions of a 1953 commercial treaty between the United
States and Japan.' A group of female secretarial employees of Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. (Sumitomo), a New York-incorporated, wholly-owned
subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, brought a class action alleging
that the corporation's practice of hiring only male Japanese nationals for
management-level positions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,3 section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' and the Thirteenth
Amendment. 5
Sumitomo sought dismissal on the ground that the Japanese Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) exempted Japanese
trading companies and their wholly owned subsidiaries in the United
52. 101 S. Ct. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
1. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty or Treaty].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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